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Abstract—This paper describes how Distributed Ledger Technolo-
gies can be used to enforce social contracts and to orchestrate the
behaviour of agents trying to access a shared resource. The first
part of the paper analyses the advantages and disadvantages of
using Distributed Ledger Technologies architectures to implement
certain control systems in an Internet of Things (IoT) setting, and
then focuses on a specific type of DLT based on a Directed Acyclic
Graph. In this setting we propose a set of delay differential equa-
tions to describe the dynamical behaviour of the Tangle, an IoT-
inspired Directed Acyclic Graph designed for the cryptocurrency
IOTA. The second part proposes an application of Distributed
Ledger Technologies as a mechanism for dynamic deposit pricing,
wherein the deposit of digital currency is used to orchestrate
access to a network of shared resources. The pricing signal is
used as a mechanism to enforce the desired level of compliance
according to a predetermined set of rules. After presenting an
illustrative example, we analyze the control system and provide
sufficient conditions for the stability of the network.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Bitcoin, and the technology that underpins it, Blockchain, have
recently become a source of great debate and controversy in
both business and scientific communities. To its supporters,
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) (the agnostic term
for Blockchain and related technologies)[1][2] is a key
technology that will unlock new disruptive business models
such as peer to peer trading, protect the rights of individuals,
democratise society, and remove the need for central arbiters
in many applications (the greedy middle that manages and
exploits our assets and identities for financial reward). To its
detractors, DLT is nothing more than pure hype, irrational
speculation, and a means to enable new forms of illegality
built on the anonymity that underpins the technology. DLT as
a technology is truly unparalleled in its ability to split and
divide opinions. Countries such as Switzerland and Singapore
are openly embracing its potential, while other countries, such
as China and India are trying to regulate its use [3]. Leading
societal thinkers are also split on DLT; with George Soros1
thinking it to be nothing more than a bubble and others such
as Al Gore embracing the idea that algorithms might one day
assume some of the functions of government2.
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Though the schism in DLT thinking is very real, everyone
seems to agree on one basic fact - that DLT is potentially a
very disruptive technology. Even opponents of the technology
are exploring the many ways it can be used, and the consequent
potential implications for society. Roughly speaking, as the
name suggests, DLT is a technology for keeping multiple
distributed copies of a single ledger. Multiple distributed
holders of this ledger achieve consensus to agree on the
contents of a ledger, and manage it in a manner so that it
cannot be altered. This ledger can be used not only to keep
track of financial transactions, but also to record “who did
what, and when” for a whole host of non-financial applications
(such as keeping track of food as it passes through a supply
chain). The immutable nature of the technology means that
DLT is suitable for a vast array of applications in which
accurate and honest records of transactions are important.
Given the ubiquity of such applications, it is unsurprising that
large corporations such as IBM3 and Facebook4 are investing
heavily in this technology.
While current applications of DLT are mainly focussed on
payments and on record keeping, our interest in the technology
stems from the need to enforce compliance in the sharing
economy applications. Motivated by a large class of such
systems, in which humans and machines, or machines and
other machines, must orchestrate their behaviour to achieve
a common goal, we are interested in using DLT as a design
tool. Even though, formally speaking, this use of DLT appears
to be new, we believe it to be very significant, and as we shall
explain, distributed ledger technologies give rise to a number
of properties that make them suitable to solve a problems that
arise in the context of Smart Cities5.
A. Motivational Examples: Smart Cities, the Sharing Econ-
omy, and Social Contracts
We are interested in designing a certain type of cyber-physical
system. In the following examples, humans and machines
must orchestrate their behaviour, sometimes sequentially,
in order to achieve a common goal - such as sharing of a
resource. Even though these examples appear mundane, they
represent an important class of common problems that are
3https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/what-is-blockchain
4https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/zuckerberg-invests-in-blockchain-to-
keep-facebook-relevant.html
5See, for example, the April 2018 issue of Proceedings of IEEE (special
issue on Smart Cities).
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2arising more frequently in the arena of smart cities.
(i) Electric vehicle (EV) charge point anxiety : Many issues
impeding the adoption of electric vehicles, such as long
charging times, and range anxiety, have been addressed by
advances in technology. One issue, that is more related to
human behaviour than technology, remains however. That is
the issue of Charge Point Anxiety. More specifically, public
charge points are often occupied in many urban centres
either by EV owners parking there for the entire workday
(despite the EV being fully charged), or by ICE vehicles
illegally occupying designated spaces. In either scenario
the charge point is unavailable to other users resulting in
under-utilization of valuable infrastructure. This leads to EV
car owners experiencing the fear that a charge point may not
be accessible when needed - Charge Point Anxiety. This is
one of the main remaining barriers preventing the mass uptake
of EVs. It is important to note that the inability to connect
vehicles to the network is not just an inconvenience for EV
owners. It also reduces the ability of the electrical grid to store
energy in the EV fleet. This is an important consideration in
the design of grid ancillary services - especially for vehicle to
grid (V2G) services and in using the vehicle fleet as a storage
buffer.
The most intuitive solution to charge point anxiety would be
increase the number of charge points in these areas but, unfor-
tunately, this is often not feasible due to cost. An alternative
idea is to develop an adapter to extend the reach of charge
points and so allow multiple EVs to connect simultaneously. To
this end we designed an adapter (called a dockChain Adapter
[4]) that allows the adapters to connect to a charge point in
a ‘daisy-chained’ or ‘cascaded’ manner as shown below in
Figure 1. It is envisaged that each car will carry an adapter
as a standard component, similar to a spare wheel. When
connecting to a charge point, the car owner connects the
adapter to the charge point (or to another dockChain adapter),
then connects the car to his/her adapter - as depicted in Figure
1.
CHARGING 
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Fig. 1. Three vehicles connected to a single charge point and charging
simultaneously using three dockChain adapters
To see how DLT technology arises in the context of this
example, suppose now that the yellow car wishes to disconnect
from the chain. The car owner simply disconnects the car
from the yellow box, and then the yellow box from the
blue box that is upstream. One must now hope that the
owner of the yellow car will connect the green and blue
boxes together (assuming that the cables reach). There is,
of course, no guarantee that this happens. One could use a
ratings based system (as used by Uber or Tripadvisor) to rate
compliance. An alternative to this approach is to incentivise
good behaviour using a crypto-token. That is, to use a digital
coin, as part of a deposit system. When the yellow car wishes
to remove itself from the chain, it deposits a digital token
into the charge point; once it reconnects the chain, its token
is returned. In this case the token is used as a bond; if it
is of sufficient value, then the yellow car owner is greatly
incentivised to reconnect the chain6.
(ii) Smart charging hubs for electric bikes : While EV’s are
currently experiencing massive growth in popularity, mainly
due to increased awareness around air-quality, they will not
solve all mobility problems in cities. First, in many cities,
the impact of such vehicles is limited, due to the way in
which people live. For example, in cities such as Berlin,
Germany, where people mostly reside in apartments, lack of
charging infrastructure (or access to it), is likely to impede
adoption. More generally, exchanging traditional vehicles for
electric vehicles, will not address problems associated with
road or parking congestion. It is in this context that electric
bikes, or pedelecs, are seen as an essential component on the
path to e-mobility. e-bikes are easily stored, do not require
any infrastructure (the battery disconnects from the bike
and can be charged from a regular wall socket), and their
range (circa 40km) makes them eminently suitable for use
in urban environments. In addition, the on-demand electrical
assist provided by the motor, effectively removes many of
the usual impediments to cycling (topology, wind, age of
cyclist). Furthermore, the opportunity to develop services,
for and from such bikes is very appealing, and it is in this
context that we are devloping, jointly with MOIXA7, a
smart battery unit. Roughly speaking, our smart battery is a
unit that aggregates the batteries from a number of e-bikes.
For example, this could be part of a mailbox system in an
apartment block. Typically, each e-bike battery is of the order
of 500 Wh; thus the aggregated amount of storage in say 30
batteries would be enough to power ancillary services in an
entire building, making such aggregations an attractive part
of any backup storage system. Similar opportunities exist for
on-street systems.
6This assumes that cables are of sufficient length to enable compliance. In
this context, note that a simple GPS chip in each box can be used to detect if
it is possible to reconnect boxes once a car is removed from the chain. The
logic for returning a token can be then refined accordingly.
7http://www.moixa.com/
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Fig. 2. A schematic of the ChargeWall system
To see how DLT technology arises in the context of this
example, we must first note that the batteries are financially
valuable parts of the e-bike system. In our system, as part of
a resident management plan, apartment owners would give
residents access to an e-bike, as well as access to shared
vehicles, in exchange for fewer parking spaces. Residents
would purchase crypto-tokens (whose value would exceed
that of a battery) and use a digital deposit system as described
above; namely in order to release a battery, users would
deposit a token into the ChargeWall, which would then be
returned when the discharged battery is returned.
(iii) The scourge of disposable cups : It should be clear to
the reader that the above problems share certain common
features; namely humans, in their interaction with machines,
must comply with certain behaviour to achieve common
societal goals. Another example of an important system of
this type concerns irresponsible waste disposal. For example,
in 2011 it was estimated that 2.5 billion coffee cups were
thrown away (the figure is likely to be higher now)8. To many,
decomposable cups are seen as the solution to this problem.
Yet, at closer inspection, the introduction of biodegradable
cups is only a small part of the solution; namely, not only
must we use such cups when drinking our coffee, we must
also put our biodegradable cup in the correct trash can or else
risk contaminating other waste. As in the previous examples,
that is where DLT comes in. One could associate a digital
token with an RFID enabled biodegradable (or reusable) cup,
and return this token once the user has placed the cup in the
correct trash can.
(iv) General compliance problems : It should be clear
to the reader that there are many smart-city compliance
problems where digital deposits can be used to enforce both
human and machine behaviour. Examples include enforcing
time-restricted parking, interfacing with 3D printers, gaining
access to charge points, and ensuring that cyclists and car
drivers comply with traffic light signalling (we shall see this
8https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43739043
last example in much more detail later). More generally,
techniques to enforce compliance with social contracts are
a fundamental part of any sharing economy system. The
design of shared systems is both topical from a practical and
theoretical perspective [5], [6]. Analytic issues associated with
developing parctical sharing systems include the following
basic questions.
(i) How many shared objects are needed to provide
population with a certain (acceptable) quality of service
[6]?
(ii) How does one manage access so that everyone gets a
fair share of the available resource [7]?
(iii) How does one regulate during periods of excess demand
(and potentially design backup buffers) [5]?
(iv) How do we enforce compliance so that people behave
in a responsible manner? For example, how do we
ensure resources are released when not in use, and
made available for others. For example, access to charge
points, and parking spaces in cities, are examples where
time-limited access is often abused.
While items (i)-(iii) have attracted attention in the literature
[5], [6], [7], [8], the very important issue of social compliance
has been discussed to a much lesser degree, and it is in
this context that we see DLT as a particularly attractive
technology. Assuming that the reader is convinced of the
merits of these applications, the reader may also ask why
DLT is the method of choice for implementation. Could one
not use any other payment method - such as PayPal or Visa
to realise such a system? The answer is that DLT is much
more suited to such applications than other digital payment
methods for a number of reasons.
(a) First, DLT is a distributed technology making it much
more robust than a centralised payment system.
(b) Second, at least some DLT technologies (e.g. Legicash,9
Byteball,10 IOTA [9]) are designed with the objective
to be more suited to high frequency micro-trading
than say PayPal or Visa. For example, sometimes, low
value transactions will not be processed by traditional
digital payment systems due to a lack of incentive in
the transaction value for vendors (note: this is also a
problem for some DLT architectures such as Bitcoin).
(c) Third, PayPal or Visa will always take a transaction
fee - making their use in digital deposit based
systems questionable; namely, where the entire value of
the token is intended to be returned to a compliant agent.
9https://legi.cash/
10https://byteball.org/
4(d) Finally, in principle, DLT tokens are more like cash
than other digital forms of payment. More specifically,
transactions are pseudo-anonymous11, that is the
cryptographic nature of the addressing is less revealing
that other forms of digital payments that are uniquely
associated with an individual, the time and location
of the spend, and the item that was transacted. This
is unlike card based transactions, which always leave
a trail of what was done and when. Thus from a
privacy perspective (re. Cambridge Analytica and
Facebook12), the use of DLT is much more satisfactory
than traditional digital transactions.
From the perspective of social compliance, fee-less transac-
tions and privacy are the key considerations.
B. Related work
Since the publication of the white paper where Blockchain
was first introduced [10], the literature on DLTs has grown
rapidly as researchers from industry and academia alike have
been trying to explore the limits of this new technology and
its possible applications. Nowadays it is possible to find plenty
of material to understand the underlying principles on which
DLTs are built: relevant reviews on the functioning principles
of the Blockchain have been presented in [11], [12] and [13],
while a thorough exposition on a more recent architecture for
DLTs, called the Tangle, can be found in [9] and [14]. In
[15] the authors discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
Blockchain taking the insurance sector as an example. Unlike
much of the literature on the topic, this paper proposes a
critical perspective, emphasizing that the Blockchain should
not be considered as a one-trick tool to be applied to every
possible domain but, rather, a new technological advancement
with its own niche of use. A similar perspective is also
discussed in [16]. Particular applications of DLTs to store
healthcare informations and IDs are presented in [17] and
[18], while [19] proposes to employ Blockchain as a means
for arbitrating roles and permissions in IoT.
Despite all these use cases, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, the use of DLTs in a control setting have yet
remained unexplored: our interest, as anticipated in an earlier
section, stems from the possible applications of DLTs in a
smart city environment, using the digital tokens as a way
to enforce the desired level of compliance in the resource-
sharing interactions between humans and machines. A natural
question that arises in this context is the value of the token
that would be lost when an agent is not compliant. If this
value is too high, (economic) activity stops and resources
are not fully utilised; if it is too low, then compliance levels
will be low and resources will not be effectively (perhaps
optimally) utilised.
11https://laurencetennant.com/papers/anonymity-iota.pdf
12https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c81zyn0888lt/facebook-cambridge-
analytica-data-scandal
It is worth noting that the idea of using control signals in
related areas is not new. For example, link pricing concepts are
standard in networking [20], and many stochastic signalling
strategies can be interpreted as a price [21], [22], [23]. More
specifically, a large number of papers have been published on
the topic of dynamic pricing being used to increase the quality
of service provided to customers in various domains. The
underlying concept is sometimes referred to as Transactive
control, which is the design of feedback loops using financial
transactions to improve quality of service in domains such as
cities or the smart grid area: particular examples on this topic
can be found in [24]-[33]. Other specific examples of dynamic
pricing can be found in [34] (incentivizing users to schedule
electricity-consuming applications more prudently), in [35]
(managing EVs charging and discharging in order to reduce
the peak loads), in [36] (combining the classical hierarchical
control in the power grid with market transactions) and [37]
(where the authors propose a transactive control system of
commercial building heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
for demand response).
In all the aforementioned works, the control mechanism is
obtained using economic transactions in the form of dynamic
toll pricing; what we propose is a form of dynamic deposit
pricing. The subtle, but substantial difference between the
two approaches is that in the first case a user has to pay
a certain amount of money in order to access a service,
whereas in the latter, a user is forced to deposit a certain
amount of tokens that will be returned once certain criteria
are met. Thus, in the latter application it is risk that is being
priced, rather than a form of demand management. In other
words, from the perspective of a single agent, the amount of
digital tokens deposited represents a risk for not complying
with a set of rules, rather than a price to pay to access a
service. It is important to stress that dynamic deposit pricing
is not a disguised form of dynamic toll pricing: in the first
the objective is optimize the use of a resource shared among
agents, in the latter the objective is to ensure that the level
of compliance is high enough to not jeopardize the system
performance (or even lead it to instability). To give a practical
example, consider a digital driving license associated with
a fixed amount of tokens. Every time the driver crosses a
checkpoint (e.g., a junction with traffic light) they deposit a
certain amount of tokens and receive them back only if they
behave as a “good citizen” (i.e., they do not break any rule
while driving). In this example, the amount of tokens does not
represent the amount of money needed to access a service but
rather, a way to ensure that a shared resource is accessed fairly
by all the agents involved. Section IV provides an example
to show how low levels of compliance negatively affect the
performance of a traffic junction and how this token model
can be employed in such a setting. It seems pretty clear then
that, while both approaches use a form of dynamic pricing as
control signal, the domains of applications are widely different.
The focus of this paper is thus twofold: in the first part we
present a concise, accurate, model for a type of DLT dynamics
that would be suitable for implementing the kind of dynamic
5deposit pricing strategies which we have envisaged. The DLT
model is designed to address the need for high-frequency,
low-latency transactions, and we analyse its properties,
providing details and a theorem about its stability. The second
part presents a class of applications based on the use of DLT
to regulate compliance levels at interacting junctions in a road
network. The situation described is just an instance of a vast
class of problems where human users are expected to adhere
to a predetermined set of rules in order to ensure an efficient
sharing of resources (see Section I-A for a set of examples).
The contributions of the paper can thus be summarised as
follows.
• A detailed model of a practically important DLT
designed for IoT applications: extensive Monte Carlo
simulations are provided to validate its behaviour and
show the accuracy of the proposed set of equations.
• An analysis of the stability of the DLT under the
hypothesis of a high arrival rate of transactions. Here,
as we shall see, stability relates to the ability to double
spend tokens (commit fraud).
• A dynamic deposit pricing mechanism to regulate
the compliance levels at interconnected activities to
ensure efficient access to a shared resource: sufficient
conditions are provided for the stability of the system.
• An application of the pricing token mechanism to road
intersections where vehicles are expected to respect
the constraints imposed by the traffic light in order to
access the junction.
C. Organization
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
describes the most well-known DLT structures and provides
an analysis of what requirements a cryptocurrency must have
to be used in smart-city related compliance problems. Section
III describes the mathematical modelling of the Tangle: first a
more general and stochastic system is presented and validated,
then, under the assumption of a high arrival rate of transactions,
a deterministic fluid model is derived and analysed in depth.
Section IV describes the use of pricing tokens in smart city
compliance problems: examples and simulations are provided
to show how low levels of compliance affect negatively the
performances of these systems. Finally, main conclusions and
future work are outlined in Section V. Note finally that the
literature on DLT architectures is split between academic
publications and non-archival sources (such as forums, web
pages, and news articles). We adopt the convention that non-
archival sources are given in the form of footnotes, and more
conventional publications in the reference list.
II. DISCUSSION OF BASIC DLT STRUCTURES
A DLT is a spreadsheet where a record of transactions
and other account information is transcribed, accessible and
(potentially) owned by every node of a Peer to Peer (P2P)
network, with an intrinsic mechanism to enforce consensus
among its users.
Such systems, despite being conceptually simple, must possess
certain properties to be useful in a large-scale compliance
problems.
P1 DLT architectures must be scalable:. That is, for IoT
applications, the number of transactions per second
between devices can be in the order of thousands.
Therefore any infrastructure needs to be able to manage
such an amount of operations.
P2 Double-spending: The DLT infrastructure must be
resilient to attacks from malicious users (e.g., the
structure must be safe against double spending attacks).
Here, by double spending, we mean the ability of an
agent to spend the same token more than once.
P3 Energy costs: With the energy costs of bitcoin already
approaching absurd levels, the energy cost to maintain
the network infrastructure consistent and safe from
attacks has to be kept at a reasonable level.
P4 Fees: Transactions should be free of transaction costs.
This is an extremely important feature from a control
perspective. Consider the examples already discussed;
if any time a transaction among devices enforces the
payment of a fee, this will eventually deplete the coin
value, thereby hindering its ability to participate in the
network regulation problems13.
P5 Price volatility: Trading a fixed number of tokens
on open platforms may be subject to significant
price fluctuations. Developing economic systems, or
using such tokens to implement a control strategy is
difficult, due to possible hoarding of tokens. Thus,
the ability to create tokens that are fixed against a
stable currency, such as the US dollar, is very important.
In this Section we provide a description of two widely used
DLT architectures, traditional Blockchain and the Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Note that such systems can be com-
pared from an architectural perspective, from the perspective
of the above items, or from the perspective of the consensus
mechanism; for example, Blockchain is a competitive consen-
sus system, whereas DAGs typically operate a swarm type
13Note that, strictly speaking, pure-fee less transactions, in general, are
clearly not possible. For example, nodes must always expend energy to support
the operation of the overall DLT system. We distinguish between these shared
infrastructure costs, and the transaction costs that are paid to a third party
to support the validation of transactions. Some DLTs, (such as IOTA - see
later) do not insist on such fees. In the case of IOTA, infrastructure costs are
shared among community members; namely, when a user transacts, that smae
user also validates another users’ transaction. This is in contrast to blockchain
where transactions are validated by special community members (the miners)
who are compensated for their efforts.
6of consensus mechanism (that use a type of majority voting
algorithm).
A. Blockchain
Blockchain was first introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in his
seminal white-paper [10] as the technology on which the
Bitcoin was developed. Since that first paper, and following
the success of Bitcoin, a large number of other currencies have
been developed trying to emulate or to improve the original
design. Almost all these currencies, at their core, share the
same functioning architecture introduced by Nakamoto.
Blockchain is a peer to peer (P2P) distributed ledger of trans-
actions [38], meaning that the ledger file (i.e., the spreadsheet
that holds every transaction record) is not stored at a central
server, but rather copies are distributed across a network of
private computers (nodes). In order to exchange currency (or
information), nodes issue transactions among each other using
public/private key cryptography [11]. Every account-holder has
a public key and a private (secret) key. The latter is used to
sign/authenticate transactions, whereas the public one provides
a unique address in the system.
Example 1. For instance, in order for a user Paul to send
a certain amount of currency to Anna, he needs to write a
transaction, signed with the private key of the address where
the coins are stored, attach his own public key to identify
himself as the sender, and address it to Anna’s public key so
as to identify her as the receiver. The transaction states that
Paul’s account balance will decrease by some amount and that
Anna’s account balance will increase by the same or lesser
amount (any difference will be taken as a transaction fee by
the successful miner, see below). This transaction is broadcast
to the network and, after validation, is applied to every copy
of the ledger.
To be validated, transactions are sent to the P2P network. If
they are consistent with all previous transactions, some specific
nodes called miners collect them together into data structures
called blocks (each miner can decide which transactions to
add to a specific block). Once a new block is proposed by a
miner, it is sent to the network; if it is valid, every other node
will add it to the end of the Blockchain. Each block contains
a reference to the previous block, and transactions in the same
block are considered to have happened at the same time;
refer to Figure 3 for a visual representation of this process.
In order to incentivise nodes to become miners, for each
transaction approved, a miner is rewarded by some amount
of currency, in the form of a transaction fee or bitcoins; in
other words, each user needs to pay a miner a certain amount
of currency for the service of adding blocks to the Blockchain.
Assuming consistency of transactions, miners must complete
a certain amount of work to validate a new block in the
Blockchain. This mechanism is known as Proof of Work
(PoW). PoW involves solving a computationally-hard puzzle;
specifically, the node that performs it needs to operate brute
force computations to find a particular hash (the image of
a hashing function [39]) in a high dimensional space that
satisfies certain conditions (due to the nature of the problem,
it is not feasible to perform anything different than a brute
force approach). The miner which adds the next block to
the Blockchain is the first one who is able to compute
a valid hash and hence solve the puzzle. The amount of
computations needed to solve it is very high and as long
as the total computational power of the honest nodes is
greater than the computational power of attackers that try
to perform double spending transactions, honest nodes will
outpace dishonest ones and only legitimate transactions will
be part of the Blockchain. In other words, any malicious
attempt to tamper with the Blockchain ledger (e.g. trying
to alter informations on past transactions) can succeed only
in the presence of a sufficient amount of computational
power. Therefore the security of the Blockchain resides on
the current amount of hashing power that is being used to
validate transactions in the network. For more information
regarding the security of Blockchain systems, the interested
reader can refer to [40]-[43]. In the event two or more miners
solve the PoW at the same time, to avoid conflicts, the
Blockchain system requires each node to build immediately
on the longest chain available. In other words, if two valid
blocks are issued at the same time, they will both be accepted
in the Blockchain: at this stage there will be two or more
possible chains on which miners can try to add further blocks.
As soon as one block is added to one of the chains, this
one (the longest chain) will be accepted by the network
and all the other ones will be discarded. In this way, the
Blockchain enforces consensus and avoids possible forks that
might endanger consistency. Thus, Blockchain may be thought
of as a system that is built on a competitive consensus method.
Despite its simplistic brilliance, PoW suffers from a major
drawback that greatly compromises its use in the long term:
in order to keep the network secure, the amount of energy
consumption to perform the computations for the PoW is
tremendously large. In order to solve this issue a system
called Proof of Stake (PoS), based not on the amount of
computational power employed but on the basis of the amount
of currency owned by each miner, has been developed. In
PoS, a validator, who is the equivalent of a miner in the PoW
is elected to add a further block to the Blockchain, on the
basis of the amount of currency possessed, and depending on
the age of the coins (usually called the maturity date). A user
with more substantial amount of coins held for a long time
will be more likely to validate a block. As in the PoW, the
validator is rewarded with a transaction fee for their effort.
This mechanism requires little or no computational power
to be executed and therefore the energy costs involved in
the PoS are negligible compared to the PoW. The interested
reader can refer to [44] for a PoS-based Blockchain protocol.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Blockchain presents scalabil-
ity issues in the form of transaction per second: at the current
time, the two most famous Blockchain based cryptocurrencies,
Ethereum and Bitcoin, are able to process up to 20 and 7
transactions per second. This, in addition to the fact that
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Fig. 3. Visual representation of three blocks of a Blockchain. Each block
references the previous one and therefore any change in any part of the chain
would result in an inconsistency.
transaction fees appear to be necessary as an incentive for
transaction approvals, poses the question of whether or not
the Blockchain is a good candidate DLT in a compliance
enforcement scenario.
B. Directed Acyclic Graphs
A different solution for achieving consensus in a DLT uses a
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The DAG is the backbone of
several cryptocurrencies (e.g., IOTA14, Byteball15, Nano16).
More specifically, a DAG is a finite directed graph with no
directed cycles. In other words, it is a graph that consists
of a finite number of vertices and edges, with each edge
directed from one vertex to another, such that there is no path
that connects a vertex ν with itself. An example of a DAG
is depicted in Figure 4. Notice that technically the graph
depicted in Figure 4 contains one cycle (i.e. vertices 2, 4,
5, 10), but the edges connecting one vertex to another are
directed in only one direction, therefore making it impossible
to find a path between any vertex to itself.
A particular instance of a DAG is the IOTA Tangle [9]. Here
the consensus method is cooperative in nature, rather than
competitive as is the case in Blockchain. The objective of
the Tangle, according to the original paper, is to design a
cryptocurrency for the IoT industry with its main features
being the absence of fees and low energy consumption. The
Tangle is basically a DAG where each vertex represents a
transaction, called a site (in the rest of the paper we might
use either site or transaction to refer to a vertex of the
Tangle), whereas the graph represents the ledger. Whenever
a new transaction is issued, this must approve two previous
transactions. Each approval represents an edge of the graph.
All yet unapproved sites are called tips and the set of all
unapproved transactions is called the tips set. A directed
edge between site i and site j, means that i directly approves
j, whereas, if there is a path (but not a single edge) that
14https://www.iota.org
15https://byteball.org
16https://nano.org
connects i to j, we say that j is indirectly approved by i (e.g.,
see Figure 5). The first transaction in the Tangle is called
the genesis block (i.e., the transaction where all the tokens
were sent from the original account to all the other accounts)
and all transactions indirectly approve it. Furthermore, in
order to prevent malicious users from spamming the network,
whenever a new transaction undergoes the approval step, it
has to perform a PoW (a much lighter version than the one
performed by the Blockchain). In what follows, we assume
that there is a simple way to verify if, during the approval
phase, the selected transactions are consistent among each
other and with all the sites directly or indirectly approved by
them. In case they were not, the selection process needs to be
run again, until two consistent transactions are found.
To have a better understanding of the previous process refer
to Figure 6: a certain instance of the Tangle, with three
new incoming transactions is presented (upper panel). The
green block (the leftmost) is the genesis site, blue blocks
are transactions that have already been approved, red blocks
represent the current tips of the Tangle and grey blocks are
new incoming transactions. Immediately, when issued, a new
transaction tries to attach itself to two of the network current
tips (middle panel). If any of the selected tips was inconsistent
with the previous transactions, or with each other the selection
would be rejected and two other tips would be selected. Notice
that at this stage, these transactions are not yet part of the
Tangle as they are carrying out the required PoW and the tips
remain unconfirmed (dashed lines) until this process is over.
Once the PoW is finished, the selected tips become confirmed
sites and the grey blocks are added to the tips set (lower panel).
Let us consider another example to explain with more detail the
process of approval. Figure 7 shows a further instance of the
Tangle. A malicious user sent a certain amount of money to a
merchant. The corresponding transaction is the yellow block in
the figure. The same user, afterwards, makes other transactions
trying to double spend the same money that were sent to the
merchant. These correspond to the green blocks. It is worth
stressing, at this point, that there is no mechanism to force a
user to select certain sites for confirmation. Any transaction
can be selected as long as it is consistent with the sites
that are approved (directly or indirectly) by it. Nevertheless
it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of nodes
would have little interest in confirming specific transactions
and would follow the tips selection algorithm proposed by
the protocol. In this scenario, all the transactions that approve
the original yellow site (the blue blocks) are incompatible
with the green ones, therefore any new transactions can either
approve the green/black sites or the blue/black ones. The
green/blue combination would be considered invalid (as there
is an inconsistency in the ledger) and a new selection would be
made. The objective of an hypothetical attacker would be then
to wait for the merchant to accept their payment, receive their
goods, then create one or more double spending transactions
that get approved by other honest sites. If this is the case, what
prevents nodes from spending their money twice? Roughly
speaking, depending on the tip selection algorithm employed,
due to the presence of the PoW, any malicious user would need
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Fig. 4. Example of a DAG with 11 vertices and 10 edges. All the vertices
are directed and it is impossible to find a path that connects any vertex with
itself.
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Fig. 5. Transaction 8 directly approves 5 and 6. It indirectly approves 1, 2
and 3. It does not approve 4 and 7.
to possess the majority of the hashing power in the Tangle to
perform such an attack and make it successful. A thorough
discussion on the possible attack scenarios of the Tangle is
beyond the scope of this paper and we refer the interested
reader to [9] and [45].
C. Blockchain vs. DAG: A social compliance perspective
While Blockchain is without doubt the genesis of the current
interest in DLT, its use in IoT scenario is limited: apart from
the large energy costs, and the volatility of coins such as
bitcoin, the long transaction times, transaction fees, and the
inherent preference for miners to process large transactions
rather than small ones, makes its use of limited value and
Fig. 6. Sequence to issue a new transaction. The green site represents
the genesis block, the blue sites represent the approved transactions and the
red ones represent the tips. The back edges represent approvals, whereas the
dashed ones represent transactions that are performing the PoW in order to
approve two tips.
represent a bottle neck for its adoption in a scenario where
thousands of devices communicate with each other many times
per second. In contrast, the DAG structure, when used to create
non-traded tokens (to remove price volatility - see P5 above),
may be much more suitable for such use cases as it is claimed
to support high-frequency (low latency) micro trading. Thus, in
the remainder of this paper we focus solely on a mathematical
description of the DAG as envisaged in the Tangle, and explain
some use cases that relate to compliance in smart cities.
III. THE MATHEMATICS OF THE DIRECTED ACYCLIC
GRAPH
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E) consists of a
set of vertices or sites V and a set of directed edges E, with
9Fig. 7. The blue and the green transactions are incompatible with each other.
the additional condition that the graph has no cycles (a cycle
is a collection of directed edges {ei = 〈ui, vi〉 ∈ E : i =
1, . . . , k} such that vi = ui+1 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and vk =
u1). When an edge e = 〈u, v〉 ∈ E is directed from u to v
(where u, v ∈ V ) we will say that v is a parent of u, and that
u is a child of v. Viewed at a high level, a Blockchain is a
simple example of a DAG, where the site set V consists of
the blocks, and the edge set E consists of the directed edges
from each block to its unique predecessor in the chain (except
for the genesis block which does not have a predecessor). In
our applications the DAG will be connected, and as in the
Blockchain there will be a unique site (the genesis) which has
no parent sites. In a finite DAG the acyclic condition implies
that there must be at least one site with no children (this can be
seen by following a path which always moves in the direction
from parent to child). The sites with no children are referred
to as the tips of the graph.
A. The IOTA Tangle
The Tangle is an increasing family of finite DAG’s {G(t) :
t ≥ 0} where each site of G(t) contains the record of a
transaction which arrived at or before time t. The DAG grows
through the addition of new sites which represent newly arrived
transactions. The special feature of the Tangle is that each
new site is attached to two pre-existing sites on the graph by
directed edges, meaning that the new site becomes the child of
both of these pre-existing sites. Furthermore both of these pre-
existing sites must be tips of the graph at the time when they
are selected by the new transaction. There is a delay between
the time when the tips are selected and the time when the new
site is attached to the Tangle. This delay allows time for a
proof of work and for the validation of the transactions in the
two parent sites (this validation ensures that the transactions
on the selected tips are consistent with each other and with
their parent sites). Hence the directed edges from the new
site represent approvals of the transactions which reside at the
existing parent sites (note that these approvals do not imply
any relation between the transaction in the new site and the
transactions in the two parent sites). The weight of a site is
(one plus) the number of sites which have approved it either
directly or indirectly, which is also (one plus) the number of its
descendants in the graph. Thus the weight of a site represents
the amount of work which would be needed to repair the
Tangle if the transaction represented by that site were altered,
and so the weight measures the security of a transaction in the
Tangle (in the Blockchain the analogous measure of security
for a transaction is the accumulated difficulty of blocks which
have been inserted subsequent to its own block).
We will describe a mathematical model for the growth of the
Tangle G(t) in a situation where one central user maintains
the record of the Tangle, and other users generate transactions
for inclusion in the Tangle. In a real network many users
would maintain local copies of the Tangle, and each user would
independently update its own copy. However this complicates
the analysis since it can lead to synchronization issues for
updates. Therefore we assume the simpler scenario where only
one user maintains the record, and other users view this record
when they create a new transaction. The model will depend
on (i) an arrival process N(t) which describes the creation
of new transactions, (ii) a tip selection algorithm, which will
describe how each newly created transaction selects two tips
for approval, and (iii) a delay time h which accounts for the
time between creation of a transaction and its addition to the
Tangle (for reasons of simplicity h will be assumed to be the
same for all transactions).
B. Random tip selection model
Our analysis will focus on the simplest tip selection algorithm,
in which each new transaction randomly and independently
selects two tips for approval. We call this the random tip
selection algorithm, and we will analyze the growth of the
Tangle under this assumption. Keeping track of the growth
of the full DAG would be quite complicated, but fortunately
the random tip selection algorithm allows us to construct a
simpler model which just keeps track of the number of tips.
In this setting the growth of the Tangle is determined by the
sequence of times when new transactions are created, and by
the selections of tips for approval. The random tip selection
algorithm was introduced and discussed in the paper [9], and
later we will compare the predictions of our model with some
of the results derived there.
We assume that when a transaction is created two tips are
immediately selected and validation is attempted (note that the
same tip may be selected twice by the new transaction, since in
the random tip selection algorithm the two choices are made
independently). If validation fails the choices are discarded
and another two tips are selected for validation. This continues
until the process is successful, and we assume that this whole
validation effort is essentially instantaneous. However after the
validation there is a waiting period h during which the proof
of work is carried out and the transaction is communicated to
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the central user where the Tangle is stored. During this time
the approvals of the selected tips are pending, so the tips may
still be available for selection by other new transactions. After
the waiting time h the two new directed edges are added to
the graph, directed from the new site to its two parent sites.
After this point the two parent sites are no longer tips, and so
are no longer available for selection by other new transactions
(note that the parent sites may have been previously selected
by earlier arrivals, in which case they ceased being tips at an
earlier time).
The reduced model involves these variables:
1) L(t) is the number of tips at time t
2) W (t) is the number of ‘pending’ tips at time t which are
being considered for approval by some new transaction
3) X(t) = L(t)−W (t) is the number of ‘free’ tips at time
t
4) Ta is the time when transaction a is created
5) N(t) is the number of transactions created up to time t
6) U(Ta) ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of free tips selected for
approval by transaction a at time Ta
We have the relation
N(t) =
∑
a:Ta≤t
1 (1)
and similar expressions for the other variables:
W (t) =
∑
a:t−h<Ta≤t
U(Ta) (2)
X(t) = N(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t
U(Ta) (3)
L(t) = N(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t−h
U(Ta) (4)
Assuming the random tip selection algorithm, U(Ta) is a
random variable whose distribution depends only on the values
of X , W and L just prior to time Ta. We assume that X,W,L
have left limits, and define X(t − 0) = lim↓0X(t − ) and
similarly for W (t− 0), L(t− 0). Then the distribution is
P(U(Ta) = 0) =
(
W (Ta − 0)
L(Ta − 0)
)2
(5)
P(U(Ta) = 1) =
(2W (Ta − 0) + 1)X(Ta − 0)
L(Ta − 0)2 (6)
P(U(Ta) = 2) =
X(Ta − 0)2 −X(Ta − 0)
L(Ta − 0)2 (7)
and the expected value is
E[U(Ta)] = 2
X(Ta − 0)
L(Ta − 0) −
X(Ta − 0)
L(Ta − 0)2 (8)
The system of equations (1-4) is well-suited for simulation:
if the transaction times {Ta} are generated according to some
rule (for example a Poisson process) then (1-4) provide the
update rules for the variables (N,X,L,W ) (updates occur at
both the creation times {Ta} and the times {Ta + h} when
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Fig. 8. Four different simulations of the Tangle with increasing delays,
h ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} (the larger the delay, the larger the steady value). Each
simulation shows 100 realizations of the reduced model with transaction times,
Ta, generated according to a Poisson distribution with λ = 60. The upper
panel shows the leaves, L(t), whereas the lower panel shows the free leaves,
X(t)
sites are added to the DAG). Some examples of the resulting
simulations are shown in Fig. 8. Note that in the paper [9] the
steady state (average) value of L was predicted to be L0 =
2λh, which is consistent with the simulations shown in Figure
8 for large arrival rates and large values of h.
Although we do not pursue these questions here, it would
be interesting to consider general properties of the stochastic
process defined by (1-4) such as the existence of a stationary
distribution and ergodicity, under reasonable assumptions for
N(t) (for example that N is a Poisson process).
C. Conflicts on the Tangle
The Tangle is designed to be a secure, reliable and robust
ledger for storing transaction records. However as explained
before it is possible for conflicting transactions to be added to
the Tangle at more or less the same time, and so the only way
for the Tangle to achieve its goal of reliable record-keeping is
to hope that conflicting records will be eliminated as the Tangle
grows. In order to explore this avenue for conflict resolution
we consider the situation where several conflicting sub-DAGs
exist on the Tangle, and analyze how the Tangle grows in
the presence of such conflicting records. Recall that a newly
created transaction will approve two parent sites that belong
to the same sub-DAG, but will never approve two parent sites
which belong to different sub-DAGs. Thus each sub-DAG will
continue to grow, but the sub-DAGs will never be joined. If this
situation were to continue indefinitely then the Tangle would
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remain inconsistent, and thus would not serve its primary
purpose as a reliable record of authenticated transactions. This
motivates investigating whether the attachment algorithm can
lead to some kind of stochastic forcing that will eliminate all
but one of the sub-DAG’s.
We will examine this question using the random tip selection
algorithm previously discussed, and assume that d conflicting
sub-DAGs exist on the Tangle. Thus every site has a label from
the set 1, . . . , d, indicating the sub-DAG to which it belongs.
We will call this the type of the site. As before we assume that
when a transaction is created the validation process is started,
and that it ends when two tips of the same type have been
chosen. At this point the site for the new transaction is labeled
the same type as the selected tips.
The new model involves these variables:
1) Li(t) is the number of tips of type i at time t, so L(t) =∑d
i=1 Li(t)
2) Wi(t) is the number of ‘pending’ tips of type i at time
t
3) Xi(t) = Li(t) −Wi(t) is the number of ‘free’ tips of
type i at time t
4) Ta is the time when transaction a is created
5) τa ∈ {1, . . . , d} is the type of the transaction a
6) Ni(t) is the number of transactions of type i created up
to time t
7) U(Ta) ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of free tips selected for
approval by transaction a at time Ta
The probability for a transaction at time t to select two tips of
type i at the first attempt is
P(type i at first attempt) =
Li(t− 0)2
L(t− 0)2 (9)
If tips of different type are selected, the choice is rejected and a
new selection is made. This continues until two tips of the same
type are chosen. Thus the eventual selection is conditioned on
the event that the two selected tips have the same type, which
occurs with probability
∑d
i=1 P(type i). Hence the probability
that a transaction is type i is
P(τa = i) =
Li(Ta − 0)2∑d
j=1 Lj(Ta − 0)2
(10)
Conditioned on the site being type i, the distribution of the
random variable U(Ta) is
P (U(Ta) = u | τa = i)
=

Wi(Ta − 0)2 Li(Ta − 0)−2 u = 0
(2Wi(Ta − 0) + 1) Xi(Ta − 0)Li(Ta − 0)−2 u = 1(
Xi(Ta − 0)2 −Xi(Ta − 0)
)
Li(Ta − 0)−2 u = 2
and therefore
E[U(Ta) = u | τa = i] = 2Xi(Ta − 0)
Li(Ta − 0) −
Xi(Ta − 0)
Li(Ta − 0)2 (11)
The relations for the variables (Ni,Wi, Xi, Li) are similar to
before:
Ni(t) =
∑
a:Ta≤t, τa=i
1 (12)
Wi(t) =
∑
a:t−h<Ta≤t, τa=i
U(Ta) (13)
Xi(t) = Ni(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t, τa=i
U(Ta) (14)
Li(t) = Ni(t− h)−
∑
a:Ta≤t−h, τa=i
U(Ta) (15)
The system (12-15) can be used to generate simulations of
the growth of the Tangle in the presence of conflicts. The
only change from before is that at each time Ta when a new
transaction is created, the type of the transaction is selected
using the distribution (10). The variables can then be updated
at times {Ta, Ta + h} according to the formulas (12-15).
D. Validation of the Tangle model
To validate the model presented in the previous paragraph
we compare its behaviour with an agent based version of the
Tangle: at each time step a random number of transactions
arrive, according to a Poisson distribution, and for each one
of these transactions the tip selection algorithm is performed
on the current tips set in order to generate graph structures
equivalent to the ones presented in detail in Section II-B. In
other words, this agent based model simulates the behaviour of
each transaction, therefore providing an accurate replica of the
mechanism described in Section IIB. The variables used for the
comparison are the number of leaves L(t) and the number of
free leaves X(t). To obtain these quantities, for the agent based
model, it is sufficient to enumerate the number of leaves and
free leaves present in the respective sets at the end of each time
step. Due to the stochastic nature of the Tangle, 500 Monte
Carlo simulations are performed in order to obtain statistically
meaningful results. Figures 9 and 10 show this comparison
for d = 1 and d = 2. In the second set of simulations, at
t = 100 a user tries to perform a double spending attack on the
Tangle. For both scenarios it is easy to notice, even by visual
inspection, that the evolution of L(t) and X(t) is identical:
the realizations of the agent based model are superimposed on
all the realizations obtained using equations (12-15), showing
that the two systems exhibit the same dynamical behaviour.
As a further note, notice how the attack in the second scenario
fails due to the fact that not enough transactions were issued
by the attacker. More details on this aspect are provided in the
remainder of this Section.
E. Fluid model
In order to gain some understanding of the system (12-15)
we consider the asymptotic regime of large arrival rate, where
the time between consecutive transactions is very small. In
this regime it should be reasonable to approximate the system
(12-15) by a fluid model. The following derivation of the
fluid model is heuristic, and it should be considered as an
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Fig. 9. Simulation of the Tangle. The blue realizations represent the agent
based model, whereas the red realizations represent the stochastic model.
The upper panel shows the leaves, L(t) and the lower panel represents the
free leaves, X(t). Each simulation shows 500 realizations of the model with
transaction times, Ta, generated according to a Poisson distribution with
λ = 60 and h = 3.
independent model for the Tangle which is motivated by the
stochastic model described in the previous sections.
We introduce a scaling parameter λ so that the arrival rate is
proportional to λ, and let λ → ∞ to reach the fluid model.
The rescaled variables {λ−1Li(t), λ−1Xi(t), λ−1Wi(t)} are
assumed to converge to deterministic limits as λ → ∞, and
the limits are represented in the fluid model by real-valued
functions {li(t), xi(t), wi(t)}. The creation of new transactions
in the fluid model is described by an arrival rate a(t) which
corresponds to the limit of λ−1N(t). Following this logic,
the arrival rate of transactions of type i in the fluid model
is a(t)pi(t), where pi(t) is obtained from (10) by rescaling
the variables:
pi(t) =
li(t)
2∑d
j=1 lj(t)
2
(16)
(we assume the variables in the fluid model are continuous and
thus li(t− 0) = li(t) etc). Furthermore the variable U(Ta) is
replaced by its time average (over a short time interval), which
by the law of large numbers is equivalent to the ensemble
average (11). By rescaling variables and letting λ → ∞,
this expected value converges to 2xi(t)/li(t). Referring to the
equation (14) the change of Xi over a small time increment δ
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
50
100
150
200
250
Fig. 10. Simulation of the Tangle with a double spending attack. The blue and
red realizations represent the two types for the agent based model, whereas
the cyan and green realizations represent the two types for the stochastic
model. The upper panel shows the leaves, L(t) and the lower panel represents
the free leaves, X(t). Each simulation shows 500 realizations of the model
with transaction times, Ta, generated according to a Poisson distribution with
λ = 60 and h = 3. At t = 100 the attacker issues 200 transactions trying to
outpace the original Tangle.
can be approximated as
Xi(t+ δ)−Xi(t)
= Ni(t− h+ δ)−Ni(t− h)−
∑
a:t<Ta≤t+δ, τa=i
U(Ta)
' δ λ a(t− h) pi(t− h)− δ λ a(t) pi(t) 2xi(t)
li(t)
= δ λ
[
a(t− h) pi(t− h)− a(t) 2xi(t)li(t)∑d
j=1 lj(t)
2
]
Applying similar reasoning to the other equations we get the
following set of delay differential equations (DDE) for the fluid
model:
dxi
dt
(t) = a(t− h) pi(t− h)− a(t)ui(t) (17)
dli
dt
(t) = a(t− h) pi(t− h)− a(t− h)ui(t− h) (18)
wi(t) = li(t)− xi(t) =
∫ t
t−h
a(s)ui(s)ds (19)
where
ui(t) =
2xi(t)li(t)∑d
j=1 lj(t)
2
(20)
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The solution of these equations {xi(t), li(t), wi(t)} can be
interpreted as a fluid model which describes the dynamics of
the Tangle with very high arrival rate, using the random tip
selection algorithm. Note that the DDE system (17 - 19) must
be supplemented by initial conditions in the interval [0, h].
F. Stability of conflicts in the fluid model
In this section we assume that the arrival rate is constant,
and we consider the existence and local stability of time-
independent solutions of the fluid model. Local stability is
analyzed using a linearization of the DDE. Given a time-
independent solution {l(0)i , x(0)i , w(0)i } of the system (17 - 19),
the linearized model is constructed by letting
li(t) = l
(0)
i + θi(t),
xi(t) = x
(0)
i + ξi(t),
wi(t) = w
(0)
i + ηi(t) (21)
and keeping only those terms in the equations which are linear
in θi, ξi, ηi. The resulting linear system of delay differen-
tial equations is denoted L(0)(θi, ξi, ηi) = 0. The solution
{l(0)i , x(0)i , w(0)i } is locally stable if
max
i
{|θi(t)|, |ξi(t)|, |ηi(t)|} → 0 as t→∞ (22)
for all solutions of the linear system. The solution is locally
unstable if there is some solution satisfying L(0)(θi, ξi, ηi) = 0
such that
max
i
{|θi(t)|, |ξi(t)|, |ηi(t)|} → ∞ as t→∞ (23)
The spectrum of the linear system L(0)(θi, ξi, ηi) = 0 is the
set of complex values z for which the system has a nonzero
solution of the form
(θi(t), ξi(t), ηi(t)) = e
zt (θi, ξi, ηi) (24)
for some constants (θi, ξi, ηi). The solution is stable if the
spectrum is contained in the open left half of the complex
plane, and is unstable if there is some element of the spectrum
in the open right half of the complex plane [47].
Theorem 1. Consider the system (17 - 20) with d ≥ 1 types,
and with arrival rate a(t) = 1. For each non-empty subset
S ⊂ {1, . . . , d} with |S| = k there is a time independent
solution
l
(0)
i = 2x
(0)
i = 2w
(0)
i =
{
2h
k i ∈ S
0 i /∈ S (25)
For all k = |S| > 1 the time independent solution is locally
unstable. For k = 1 the time independent solution is locally
stable.
Remark: there are 2d−1 possible static solutions, correspond-
ing to all possible non-empty subsets of {1, . . . , d}. In each
static solution the total (rescaled) number of tips is 2h, and
this total is shared equally between the nonzero components.
So the static solutions describe Tangles with equally sized
conflicting sets of tips. The linearized model describes the
growth and decay of solutions which are close to the solutions
(25). So Theorem 1 shows that all time-independent solutions
are unstable except for the case where there is just one type.
This is consistent with the simulations of the full model shown
in Figure 10.
Proof: we look for steady state solutions of the system (17 -
19):
xi(t) = xi, li(t) = li (26)
This immediately leads to
l2i∑
j l
2
j
= 2xi
li∑
j l
2
j
(27)
and hence
l2i = 2xili (28)
Thus either li = 0 or li = 2xi. Similarly the relation
li − xi =
∫ t
t−h
ui ds = ui h (29)
leads to either xi = 0 or∑
j
l2j = 2h li (30)
Thus all nonzero components {li} must be equal, and
∑
j lj =
2h. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , d} be the number of nonzero components
of the static solution, then these nonzero components are
xi =
h
k
, wi =
h
k
, li =
2h
k
(31)
To investigate local stability we consider small time dependent
perturbations of the static solutions. If k < d there are types
with l(0)i = 0, and these do not contribute to the linearized
equations. Thus without loss of generality we can suppose
that k = d, so the static solution is l1, . . . , ld = 2h/d and
x1, . . . , xd = h/d. Consider time dependent solutions of the
form
xi(t) =
h
d
+ ξi(t), li(t) =
2h
d
+ θi(t) (32)
where ξi, θi are small. Then to linear order
ui(t) =
1
d
+
1
h
ξi(t) +
1
2h
θi(t)− 1
dh
∑
j
θj(t) (33)
pi(t) =
1
d
+
1
h
θi(t)− 1
dh
∑
j
θj(t) (34)
and the DDE equations to linear order are
dξi
dt
=
1
h
[
θi(t− h)− 1
d
∑
j
θj(t− h)
−ξi(t)− 1
2
θi(t) +
1
d
∑
j
θj(t)
]
dθi
dt
=
1
h
[
1
2
θi(t− h)− ξi(t− h)
]
(35)
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In order to investigate local stability, we consider a perturbation
of the form
ξi(t) = ξie
zt, θi(t) = θie
zt (36)
where ξi, θi are constant, and z is a complex parameter.
Substituting (36) into (35) leads to the equations
(1 + hz) ξi = −1
2
θi +
1
d
∑
j
θj +
θi − 1
d
∑
j
θj
 e−zh
hz θi =
(
1
2
θi − ξi
)
e−zh (37)
For d > 1 we now display a class of solutions for which z is
real and positive, thus implying local instability. To this end
consider the equation
1 +
1
2
x− e−x − xex − x2ex = 0 (38)
It can be easily checked that the left side of (38) is zero and
increasing at x = 0, and is negative at x = 1. Thus there is a
positive real solution x0 satisfying 0 < x0 < 1 (calculations
show that x0 ' 0.18). Define r0 = 12 − x0ex0 , and let θ =
(θ1, . . . , θd)
T be any nonzero vector with
∑d
j=1 θj = 0. Then
it can be verified that there is a solution of (37) with z =
x0h
−1 and ξi = r0θi for i = 1, . . . , d. The existence of this
solution implies that the static solution is locally unstable for
d > 1. Conversely if
∑d
j=1 θj 6= 0 then the parameter z must
satisfy the equation
1 + hz =
1
2
e−zh (39)
It can be easily checked that every solution of (39) lies in the
open left half plane, and thus solutions with
∑d
j=1 θj 6= 0 do
not lead to local instability. This implies in particular that for
d = 1 the static solution is locally stable.
G. Summary of results
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that conflicting trans-
actions cannot coexist on the Tangle in the regime of large
arrival rate when the random selection algorithm is used to
select tips for approval. The fluid model does allow conflicting
sub-DAGs to co-exist as long as they have exactly equal
numbers of tips, however the local instability result derived
in this section implies that any small imbalance will quickly
be amplified, and we expect that this instability will eventually
lead to the removal of all but one of the sub-DAGs. The time
scale for this effect is proportional to the delay parameter h
in the model. We conjecture that a stronger stability result
holds, namely that all solutions of the fluid model (except the
ones with exactly balanced sub-DAGs) converge to the static
solution with d = 1 as t→∞.
The fluid model is presumed to approximate the full stochastic
model for large arrival rate, and of course the stochastic model
will continually exhibit small fluctuations. Thus the locally
unstable solutions of the fluid model should not appear in
the stochastic model, and this conclusion is indeed supported
by our simulations of the Tangle, for example in Figure 10.
It is intuitively plausible that the random selection algorithm
will remove conflicts on the Tangle through this stochastic
forcing mechanism, and it is reassuring that the fluid model
shows the same behavior. The paper [9] pointed out some
potential weaknesses of the random selection algorithm which
might be exploited to attack the Tangle. That paper also
proposed a different tip selection algorithm based on a random
walk along the DAG, which might provide more protection
against malicious attacks. It would be interesting to analyze
this random walk algorithm using the methods presented here.
IV. DLT FOR SOCIAL COMPLIANCE
We now return to the use-cases described in the introduction.
We are interested in using DLT to create a privacy preserving
mechanism to enforce social contracts in situations where
machines, and other machines, or humans, must orchestrate
their actions to ensure efficient sharing of resources. In
this context the digital token is used as a bond, or digital
deposit, to ensure that various agents comply with social
contracts. The risk of losing a token is then the mechanism
that encourages agents to comply with these social contracts.
A natural question that arises in this context is the value
associated with tokens that enforce a particular activity. If
we set the value too low, then the risk is of no interest to
an agent and the social contract is not enforced. If we set
this value too high the activity may be suppressed entirely
for fear of losing tokens, and the societal contract also fails.
Thus we wish to place a value on tokens so that they freely
move in our system, but also so that they encourage almost
full compliance of all agents participating in the system. The
issue of finding this value is the subject of this present section.
Before proceeding it is worth noting that the issue of
compliance is sometimes not addressed in studies of algorithms
to regulate, control, and optimise city infrastructures. Many
publications addressing smart city problems assume full
compliance with policies that have been engineered to
optimally organise city infrastructures. For example, papers
on optimisation of traffic lights frequently do not consider
the issue of compliance. Of course, humans break rules, and
the effect of this rule-breaking often profoundly affects how
cities operates. For example, readers will be certainly familiar
with the effect of drivers and cyclists who break red lights or
block traffic junctions, especially during very busy periods of
road usage.
In what follows, we explore the use of our DLT strategy to
regulate access to interacting junctions in a road network. A
specific example could be a network of streets with traffic
lights at the intersections, and a population of road users who
share the space with other traffic. The compliance goal is
that agents (cyclists, drivers) will be ‘good citizens’ and will
respect the instructions from the traffic lights. The control
mechanism is an automatic token exchange whereby each
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agent arriving at a light will deposit some number of tokens
with the junction. If the agent obeys the traffic lights when
crossing the intersection then the tokens will be returned;
otherwise the tokens will be kept by the system. Clearly,
penalties of this type are already in place in many cities
using cameras. From a drivers perspective, the potential
benefit of losing a deposit over, say, camera based fines, is
anonymity. Specifically, for minor indiscretions, the miscreant
is penalised without a record of the offence ever being
recorded, or made visible to a central entity. Of course,
when all tokens expire from the wallet, this information is
communicated to a municipality and the offender is no longer
allowed to drive. To realise such a system we assume that
car drivers have a unique digital wallet, and that tokens are
exchanged with digital wallets in the fixed infrastructure in
the usual manner17. The number of tokens required at the
intersection can be adjusted in real time in order to control
the level of compliance. To give a practical example of how
these tokens could work, they could be issued by the city
council and sold for a fixed amount of money to every driver
or they could work in a similar way to the driving license
points that are used in the states of the European Union
(therefore, your license is valid as long as you have a positive
amount of points). The model assumes that each agent will
choose whether to comply with the local traffic light based
on both the cost of non-compliance (leading to lost tokens) as
well as their observation of the behavior of other agents (the
assumption being that agents are influenced by how others
behave). Note in this model, we could assume, for example,
that each road user may only use a road if he/she has a
positive token balance. Once a balance goes to zero, the user
is no longer allowed to travel.
To show why this is effectively an interesting area to focus
on, in what follows we present the effects on the traffic of a
single junction as the compliance rate, Q(t) decreases. Figure
11 shows a single junction where a traffic light coordinates
the traffic flow of three roads: every Ts units of time the
traffic light switches and allows cars from a different road to
pass. The amount of time for a vehicle to cross the junction is
referred to as TJ . The number of cars that crosses the junction,
per time unit, is fixed and is referred to as FJ . At the same
time, each time unit, a certain number of cars, Ar is randomly
distributed among each road, according to a uniform distri-
bution, increasing the length of each corresponding queue. In
what follows we refer to the lengths of the three queues as V1,
V2, V3 and the average queue length as V¯ , whose magnitude
will be used in what follows as an estimate of the performance
of the junction (i.e., the larger the average queue, the worse the
junction performs). Furthermore, there is a probability, namely
1 − Q(t), that at time t a car from one of the queues with a
red traffic light will go through. In this scenario, to take into
account that cars are likely to slow down during this event, the
crossing time increases by a fixed quantity, τd . To appreciate
the effects of the compliance rate Q(t) consider a junction with
17 Note that in this realisation, reasonable transaction delays can be tolerated
in the token exchange mechanism.
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Fig. 11. Visual illustration of the junction example.
Ts = 10, TJ = τd = 1, FJ = 3 and Ar as a random number
generated by a Poisson distribution of mean λ = 1. Figure 12
shows V¯ , averaged across 100 Monte Carlo simulations as the
compliance level decreases from 1 to 0.8 (by 0.1 ticks). Note
that while in the case for Q = 1, the junction works smoothly
(Figure 13 shows the individual behaviour of V1, V2 and V3 in
a single realization of the process), even a small level of non
compliance is enough to compromise the system performance
and the delays caused by larger levels of non compliance are
enough to make the system unstable. These results lead us to
believe that the derivation of a control mechanism based on
pricing tokens to avoid high level of non compliance, can be
an effective way of improving the quality of services in cities.
The control model for this system will be described by a
series of differential equations for the cost of tokens (the
cost of non-compliance) based on how the current compliance
levels compare to some target levels. Sufficient conditions are
established for the existence of a locally stable solution which
achieves the target compliance goals.
A. The network model
Consider a system of n physically separated activity centers
(for example road junctions), and a population of agents
moving between these activities. The cost of participation at
activity i at time t is Ci(t), and the probability of compliance
at activity i at time t is Qi(t), with 0 ≤ Qi(t) ≤ 1. The time
averaged compliance level Qi(t) is defined as
Qi(t) =
1
w
∫ t
t−w
Qi(s) ds (40)
where w > 0 is a fixed window size for the average.
For each pair of activities (i, j) the time lag τi→j is the
minimum time needed for an agent to move from i to j (where
τi→i = 0 by definition). The compliance level at activity i
is assumed to depend on the cost Ci as well as the time
averaged compliance levels for other activities, delayed by the
corresponding time lags: for i = 1, . . . , n
Qi(t) = fi
(
Q1(t− τ1→i), . . . , Qn(t− τn→i), Ci(t)
)
(41)
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Fig. 12. Each image shows V¯ (t), averaged across 100 Monte Carlo
simulations. The compliance level for each simulation goes from 1, (upper
panel) to 0.7 (lower panel). As the Compliance level decreases the performance
of the system degrades until it becomes unstable.
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Fig. 13. Single realization of V1, V2 and V3 for the junction system.
The function fi is unknowable, but for the purposes of this
analysis some basic properties can be assumed: in particular it
is assumed that fi is differentiable, and that for all i = 1, . . . , n
the function fi is monotone increasing in its last argument, so
that
∂fi
∂Ci
> 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n (42)
Also we define the feasibility region F to be the set of
compliance levels (Q1, . . . , Qn) which can be achieved as
time-independent solutions of (41) using some valid choice
of costs (C1, . . . , Cn):
F = {(Q1, . . . , Qn) : ∃ (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ [0,∞)n
s.t.Qi = fi(Q1, . . . , Qn, Ci), i = 1, . . . , n} (43)
The assumption (42) implies that for each (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈
F there is a unique set of costs (C1, . . . , Cn) such that the
equations Qi = fi(Q1, . . . , Qn, Ci) are satisfied for each i =
1, . . . , n.
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For each activity i there is a fixed target compliance level Q(T )i ,
and the control equation for the cost Ci is assumed to have
the form
dCi
dt
= gi
(
Q
(T )
i −Qi(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n (44)
The function gi is a design parameter, and in particular is
chosen so that gi(0) = 0, gi is differentiable and g′i(0) > 0.
To summarize, the components of the model are
Ci(t) = cost of token to start activity i at time t
Qi(t) = compliance level for activity i at time t
[0 ≤ Q ≤ 1, where Q = 1 is total compliance]
Qi(t) = time averaged history of compliance
w = window size for time average
F = feasibility region for compliance levels
Q
(T )
i = target compliance level for activity i
fi(· · · ) = compliance level function
gi(·) = cost function
τi→j = time lag between activities i and j
Remark: We want to stress the fact that while in this model
the amount of deposit C(t) is the same for every user, it
is easy to imagine extending equations (44), by taking into
account variables that we neglected in our current analysis
(e.g., individual wealth, amount of times the particular resource
is used, amount of previous transgressions, etc.).
B. Static solution
For a time-independent or static solution the cost Ci must be
constant for each i = 1, . . . , n. From (44) and the assumptions
on the functions gi it follows that the static solution must
satisfy
Qi(t) = Q
(T )
i for all t, for all i = 1, . . . , n (45)
These conditions are possible only if the target compliance
levels are in the feasibility region, that is if (Q(T )1 , . . . , Q
(T )
n ) ∈
F . In this case there are unique costs (C(T )1 , . . . , C(T )n ) such
that
Q
(T )
i = fi
(
Q
(T )
1 , . . . , Q
(T )
n , C
(T )
i
)
, i = 1, . . . , n (46)
Thus the system has a unique static solution for every set of
target compliance levels in the feasibility region.
C. Local stability analysis
To investigate local stability of the solution we consider
perturbations of the static solution of the form
Ci(t) = C
(T )
i + αi(t), Qi(t) = Q
(T )
i + βi(t) (47)
where αi, βi are small. Also define
θi(t) =
1
w
∫ t
t−w
βi(s) ds (48)
Then keeping only terms of lowest non-trivial order, and
assuming differentiability of all functions {fi, gi} gives the
system of linear equations
dαi
dt
= −g′i(0)βi(t)
βi(t) =
n∑
j=1
Dij θj(t− τj→i) + Ei αi(t) (49)
where
Dij =
∂fi
∂Qj
(
Q
(T )
1 , . . . , Q
(T )
n , C
(T )
i
)
(50)
Ei =
∂fi
∂Ci
(
Q
(T )
1 , . . . , Q
(T )
n , C
(T )
i
)
(51)
In order to investigate stability of this linear system it is
sufficient to consider perturbations of the form
αi(t) = αi e
zt, βi(t) = βi e
zt (52)
where z is a complex parameter. This assumption leads to the
relations
θj(t− τj→i) = 1
wz
(
1− e−wz) ez(t−τj→i) βj (53)
αi = −g
′
i(0)
z
βi (54)
Substituting (53) into (49) gives the eigenvalue equation for
each i = 1, . . . , n:
n∑
j=1
Dij e
−zτj→i βj =
w
1− e−wz (z + Ei g
′
i(0))βi (55)
The system (49) is locally stable if all solutions of (55) occur
with z in the open left half plane [47]. In order to analyze this
condition, let M(z) denote the matrix with entries
(M(z))ij = (z + Ei g
′
i(0))
−1
Dij e
−zτj→i (56)
Then letting β = (β1, . . . , βn)T denote the vector of values,
the system (55) can be written as
M(z)β =
w
1− e−wz β (57)
Let {λa(z)}na=1 denote the eigenvalues of M(z), then a
sufficient condition for local stability is that all values of z
which for some a ∈ {1, . . . , n} yield a solution of the equation
λa(z) =
w
1− e−wz (58)
should lie in the open left half plane. Although this condition
involves the precise details of the entries of the matrix M(z),
it is possible to find a general sufficient condition. Namely, for
any z in the closed right half plane, the modulus of the right
side of (58) is greater than or equal to w/2. Thus a sufficient
condition is
Re(z) ≥ 0 ⇒ |λa(z)| < w
2
for all eigenvalues λa (59)
We will next analyze how this condition applies to a simple
network.
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D. Special case: a ring network
We introduce a simple network in order to analyze the sta-
bility question in more detail. So consider a network of n
activities arranged in a ring, and assume that the lag time
τi→j = τj→i = τ is constant between all pairs of nearest
neighbors i, j. Furthermore assume that each activity is directly
influenced only by its nearest neighbors, and that there is a
constant D > 0 such that
Dij =
{
D if i, j are nearest neighbors
0 otherwise
(60)
Finally assume also that the values g′i(0) and Ei are constant,
and let
δ = Ei g
′
i(0) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n (61)
Then the eigenvalues of the matrix M(z) are
λa(z) =
De−zτ
z + δ
2 cos
(
2pia
n
)
, a = 1, . . . , n (62)
Letting z = x+ iy with x ≥ 0, we have the bound
|(λa(z))| ≤ 2D
δ
(63)
Therefore (59) implies that a sufficient condition for local
stability is
D <
wδ
4
(64)
The parameter D records the sensitivity of the compliance
functions (41) to the behavior of their neighboring activities.
So for fixed w, δ the condition (64) requires that agents are
not unduly influenced by the behavior of agents at other
locations. For more complicated networks the same general
result applies, namely that weak influence between agents at
different activities leads to local stability of the static solution.
E. Example: single junction
We now return to the single junction introduced in Section IV.
In order to prevent the drastic decrease in performance due to
the compliance level and to maintain the traffic of the junction
within acceptable levels (with respect to the optimal level
of compliance), we make use of the token system described
in Section IV-A: assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the
dynamics of the cost, C(t) are chosen as a first order system
and that the compliance rate depends linearly on C(t):
Q(t+ 1) = βC(t+ 1), (65)
C(t+ 1) = τCC(t) +K(Q
(T ) −Q(t)), (66)
where t represents the time unit of the junction system,
the parameter β represents values that can be empirically
extracted by data collected at the junction and τC and K
represent the design parameters for the control system. Figure
14 shows V¯ (t) (upper panel), Q(t) (middle panel) and C(t)
(lower panel): after an initial transient (where the oscillations
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Fig. 14. Simulation of the junction system, with β = 0.6, τC = 1,K =
0.1, V¯ (0) = C(0) = 0. The upper panel shows the average queue length,
V¯ (t), the middle panel shows the compliance level Q(t) and the lower panel
show the cost, C(t).
are emphasized for illustrative purposes) Q(t) stabilizes
around the desired compliance rate (0.95, in this example).
Furthermore, note that the steady state value of C(t) depends
on the parameters of equation (65) (specifically on the choice
of β). These values are supposed to be extracted empirically
from real data (see equation (41)) and therefore it needs to be
stressed that the particular steady state value reached by C(t)
depends specifically on the arbitrary choice for this example.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The contributions of the paper are divided into two main parts.
In the first one we present a stochastic model for one choice of
a DAG-based DLT (the Tangle), and demonstrate its validation
through an extensive Monte Carlo analysis. The results of the
validation show that our model matches with a high degree of
accuracy the real Tangle. Then, under the assumption of a high
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arrival rate of transactions, we derive a deterministic version
of the stochastic model and show, through a local instability
theorem, that conflicting transactions can not coexist when a
random tip-selection algorithm is employed. The second part
presents a general framework to apply DLTs as a control
mechanism for social compliance in smart city environments:
first we show, through the example of a junction with a traffic
light, how even small levels of non compliance can lead such
a simple system to instability. This example is then gener-
alized to a generic set of interconnected activities in a road
network to which the DLT-based control mechanism is applied.
Finally, we present sufficient conditions for the stability of
the controlled system. As for future lines of research, the
present work can be extended in a series of directions: the
current Tangle model takes into account constant delays and a
random selection algorithm for tip; it would be interesting to
relax these assumptions to analyse the Tangle behaviour with
variable delays and different tips selection strategies. Moreover
the model for social compliance can be further elaborated by
taking into account different factors that concur to determine
the price C(t) (e.g. individual wealth, amount of times the
particular resource is used, previous transgressions, feasibility
of the price, etc.) and it would be interesting to study whether
or not the system exhibits a stable behaviour under these
conditions.
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